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Recent literature on tax administration in poor countries suggests that inducing more fiscal 
corruption may contribute to reducing tax evasion and increasing tax revenues. But does such 
an intriguing paradox justify policies that stimulate corruption? Our answer is no, and this note 
puts forward three arguments to support our view.  First, while an increase in corruption may 
raise revenues in the short run, in general the opposite will be the case in the longer run. 
Second, the instrumental value of reducing corruption goes far beyond its effects on tax 
evasion and tax revenues. Accepting corruption as a policy strategy to increase tax revenues 
may undermine values of democracy and good governance. Third, eliminating corruption 
should be considered an end in itself. Thus, contrary to recent suggestions on incentive reforms 
in tax administration, the reasonable starting point for policy debates in this area should still be 
that an increase in fiscal corruption is not an appropriate instrument for raising tax revenues. 
Sustained development cannot grow from an institutional framework that fosters corruption 
and extra-legal tax enforcement. 
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One of the areas of government where the impacts of corruption loom largest is in the 
assessment and collection of taxes (Galtung, 1995). Studies in various developing countries 
indicate that it is not uncommon that half or more of the taxes that should be collected cannot 
be traced by government treasuries due to corruption and tax evasion (Alm et al., 1991; Bird, 
1990, 1992; Krugman et al., 1992; Richupan, 1984). This tax-base erosion is particularly 
damaging [WLB1]since insufficient domestic revenue mobilisation is considered the root of the 
adjustment and growth problems faced by many poor countries (Chand & Moene, 1999). To 
alleviate this problem, tax reforms in recent years have focused on redesigning the tax 
structures and improving tax administration. Addressing fiscal corruption and tax evasion have 
become integrated parts of this strategy (Klitgaard, 1988; Toye & Moore, 1998).  
 
A growing literature emphasises the importance of incentive schemes in motivating tax officers 
to work harder and in accordance with the overruling objective of improving revenue 
performance (Mookherjee, 1997; Das-Gupta & Mookherjee, 1998; Chand & Moene, 1999). 
Such incentive schemes may, however, increase corruption. Actually, as we will elaborate on in 
Section 2, a standard way of justifying incentive schemes is by showing that such schemes 
strengthen the position of corrupt tax officers and thereby makes tax evasion less attractive. 
Nevertheless, it is argued, in cases where the effect on taxpayers’ compliance and government 
revenues is positive, incentive schemes are still justified: “Eliminating corruption is … not an 
end in itself; effects on tax evasion and revenues are more fundamental” (Mookherjee, 
1997:16).  
 
In this note we put forward three arguments that question this way of defending incentive 
schemes. First, while an increase in fiscal corruption may contribute to an increase in tax 
revenues in the short run, it is highly implausible that such an increase is sustainable (Section 
3). The dynamics of corruption suggest that policies of this kind will decrease tax revenues in 
the long run. Second, a much broader view of this problem is needed in the development 
debate, including the effects of fiscal corruption on accountability and government legitimacy 
(Section 4). Third, eliminating corruption is an end in itself. In our view, any reasonable 
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conception of a good society should count corruption - [WLB2]that is, the abuse of public offices 
and rules for personal gain - as intrinsically bad (Section 5).  
 
2. The virtue of fiscal corruption 
How may corruption contribute to reducing tax evasion and thereby increasing tax revenues? 
The essential link, studied by Mookherjee (1997) among others, is based on the idea that the 
possibility to negotiate bribes from evasive taxpayers motivate corrupt tax officers to work 
harder in order to detect evasion. This will be anticipated by the taxpayers, and hence tax 
evasion will be less attractive because it is more likely to be detected.  
 
Since corruption works to make tax evasion less appealing and thereby may increase tax 
revenues, one might find it a good idea to design a bonus system for tax collectors that mimics 
or competes with the bribery system already in place in many tax administrations[WLB3]. 
Actually, this has been attempted in Ghana (Chand & Moene, 1999) and suggested in several 
other countries, including Uganda. The intention behind a bonus system is to initiate more 
work effort among tax collectors by promising them a share of the tax revenues. And this is the 
way it works for non-corrupt tax collectors, who within a bonus system aim at detecting 
evasion because this increases tax revenues and thereby their income. But what about corrupt 
tax collectors?  
 
Consider a bribe as the outcome of a negotiation between an evasive taxpayer and a corrupt tax 
collector. The introduction of a government bonus certainly makes the bribe less attractive for 
the corrupt tax collector, because he has to give up the bonus when accepting the bribe[WLB4]. 
But this does not necessarily insure that the tax collector becomes less corrupt. Actually, it 
makes him stronger in his negotiations with the taxpayer, and as a result he receives a larger 
part of the pie not reported to the tax authorities. Thus, the bonus system provides incentives 
for the corrupt tax collector as well (by increasing the negotiated bribe), and may thereby 
contribute to increase tax revenues. This happens because the bonus system strengthens the 
position of the corrupt tax collector and therefore may increase overall corruption.1 
 
Generally, the implications of a bonus system depend on whether the tax administration 
consists of corrupt or non-corrupt tax collectors. In both cases, we might experience an 
increase in overall tax revenues, but in the case with corrupt tax collectors the bonus system 
may also lead to increased corruption. Hence, in a situation where there is a mixture of corrupt 
and non-corrupt tax collectors, it seems straightforward to say that we have to make a trade-off 
between the gain of more revenues and the problem of more corruption when evaluating a 
                                                   
1 The total amount of bribes received by corrupt tax collectors will not necessarily increase in equilibrium. This 
depends on the reaction of the taxpayer to the fact that the work effort of the tax collector increases. 
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bonus system. However, this is not how bonus systems are justified in the theoretical literature 
on corruption and incentives.  
 
Mookherjee (1997), for example, considers bonus systems in the context of corrupt tax 
collectors only, and then argues for the need “to go beyond the question of what levels of 
corruption arise and examine induced effects on tax compliance and audit incentives” (p. 13). 
Hence, when evaluating bonus systems, Mookherjee solely considers the possible gain in tax 
revenues following from the fact that the position of corrupt tax officers is strengthened. In our 
view, this way of justifying bonus systems should be rejected because it does not capture the 
long-term effects of an increase in corruption on tax revenues and government legitimacy. We 
find it highly implausible that sustained development can grow from an institutional framework 
that fosters corruption and extra-legal tax enforcement. 
 
Mookherjee is of course aware of the vices of corruption, but suggests simply that “if incentive 
reform causes various undesired side effects, the range of policy instruments must be expanded 
to moderate their effects” (p. 8). However, this is a problematic position within the present 
mode of reasoning. If one considers an increase in corruption an undesirable side effect to be 
moderated, then an incentive reform cannot be justified by showing that it increases tax 
revenues by (possibly) inducing more corruption. Such a justification would be undermined by 
the policies aiming at reducing corruption.  
 
Let us consider another example of how the strengthening of the position of corrupt tax 
collectors has been considered part of a “virtuous circle” in reforming tax administrations. 
Chand & Moene (1999) are concerned with the need for non-corrupt higher-level bureaucrats 
in tax administration when introducing bonus systems, and motivate this by the following 
story. Look at a corrupt tax collector who tries to negotiate a bribe from an evasive taxpayer in 
return for underreporting his tax liabilities. If they don’t reach an agreement - that is, if the 
taxpayer refuses to pay the bribe and the collector reports the evasion - a higher-level 
bureaucrat is informed about the true tax liability of the taxpayer and settles the case. If the 
higher-level bureaucrat is corrupt, the evasive taxpayer pays him a bribe and provides taxes 
only on the underreported tax liability. In contrast, a non-corrupt higher-level bureaucrat 
collects the taxes on the true tax liabilities. Therefore, the presence of a non-corrupt higher-level 
bureaucrat strengthens the position of the corrupt tax collector in the negotiations with the 
taxpayer. Why? Because it becomes less important for the corrupt collector to reach an 
agreement with the taxpayer. The collector knows that as long as the higher-level bureaucrat is 
not corrupt, he will receive the bonus on the whole tax liability if he does not reach an 
agreement with the taxpayer. This would not be the case if the higher-level bureaucrat were 
corrupt. The tax collector would then not receive any bonus. Hence, in order to have an 
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effective bonus system, non-corrupt higher-level bureaucrats are required. They make it 
possible for the corrupt tax collector to get a higher bribe by strengthening the collector’s 
bargaining position in relation to taxpayers and thereby also stimulates his work effort. 
Consequently, this will contribute to an increase in tax revenues in the short run. But is this 
really the virtue of having non-corrupt higher-level bureaucrats in tax administration when 
introducing a bonus system?  
 
Let us close this section by briefly pointing at some of the mechanisms we expect to reflect the 
real virtues of an incentive reform. First, as already stressed, an effective bonus system induces 
more effort among non-corrupt tax collectors. Second, and maybe more important, a bonus 
system, within an administration containing non-corrupt higher-level bureaucrats, may cause 
less corruption among tax collectors.2 Let us provide a simple illustration of this point. Assume 
that a company reports the profit R, whereas the true profit is P. The tax rate is t and the bonus 
rate is g. All tax collectors assign a certain disvalue 
m
1
 to accepting a bribe, m ³  1, where  
m = 1 would imply that the tax collector is indifferent between receiving a certain amount of 
money as a bribe or as a regular bonus. If the tax collector does not accept the bribe and reports 
the evasion to a non-corrupt higher-level bureaucrat, then he receives a bonus on the true 
profit. In this case, a collector would only accept a bribe b if[WLB5]:3 
 
(1) gtR + b/m > gtP. 
 
Obviously, the bribe will not exceed the tax saved on the underreported amount t(P - R).4 
Hence, on the basis of (1), we find a cut-off value m* such that no tax collector having a value 
above m* would choose to be corrupt. 
 
(2) m* = 1/ g .                                                                                                                  
 
From (2), we can see that an increase in the bonus (g) decreases m* which indicates that the 
number of corrupt tax collectors should decrease in an effective bonus system.5  
 
                                                   
2 See also Besley & McLaren (1993) for a related discussion. 
3 We do not consider the issue of monitoring, and hence the tax collector knows for certain that the acceptance of a 
bribe will not be punished. The example can, however, easily be extended to include monitoring, but this would not 
add anything to our story.  
4 The possibility of extortion is not considered in this simple example (see Hindriks et al., 1999; and Klitgaard, 
1988). 
5 Here, we ignore the equilibrium response of the companies, and assume that they do not increase underreporting 
when the bonus increases. Notice that m* is not the critical value of m defining the partitioning of the set of tax 
collectors into corrupt and non-corrupt, and that we implicitly assume a continuous distribution of the value of m 
among tax collectors. Thus, we cannot draw any definite conclusions from (2), but for our purpose this should give 
a reasonable indication of the mechanism in question. 
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To summarise, there are important positive effects from incentive reforms in the tax 
administration. It makes non-corrupt tax collectors work harder, and it may reduce the number 
of corrupt tax collectors in the administration. However, we question the claim that one of the 
positive effects is that increased tax revenues can be achieved by stimulating corruption among 
corrupt tax collectors. We now turn to a further discussion of this issue. 
 
 
3. Long-term impacts of fiscal corruption[WLB6] 
Poor taxpayer compliance is particularly damaging in situations with substantial budget deficit, 
as is the case in many poor countries (Tanzi, 1991). However, accepting fiscal corruption as an 
instrument for raising revenues in the short run may undermine tax collection in the longer run, 
for several reasons. Let us here point at some of the most important ones.  
 
First, implicit in the discussion of the positive link between fiscal corruption and tax revenues is 
the assumption that the willingness to pay taxes is independent of the way taxes are collected. 
This assumption is in contrast to the literature on reciprocity considerations in tax collection. 
For instance, Smith (1992:227) argues that tax authorities' unresponsive, corrupt and unfair 
treatment of taxpayers foster disrespect for and resistance against tax authorities and tax laws.6 
In a study from Tanzania, Fjeldstad & Semboja (2001) find that the unresponsive way taxes are 
enforced appear to have fuelled tax resistance. Accordingly, they argue, tax evasion may to 
some extent be interpreted as a strategy of public resistance and opposition against the 
authorities. Hence, an increase in corruption may establish a negative public perception that 
causes citizens to be unwilling for a long period to enter into reciprocal relationships with the 
government. Thus, accepting fiscal corruption as an instrument to raising revenues may 
contribute to undermining the legitimacy of the tax administration, and thereby increase tax 
evasion and decrease tax revenues over time (Tanzi, 2000, 1995). We believe this to be an 
important issue, because public opinion is not easily restored over time. 
 
Second, the relationship among tax collectors also needs to be considered. Tax collectors do 
not operate on their own, but are influenced by the behaviour of their reference group, such as 
colleagues and friends.7 As stressed by Fehr & Gächter (2000:167), “[s]ocial sanctions by peer 
members are probably a very important determinant of effort behavior in work relations.” 
                                                   
6 This proposition can also be stated in positive terms: Tax authorities responsive, honest, respectful and fair 
treatment of taxpayers tend to foster respect for and co-operation with the tax system. 
7 
Therefore, if a tax officer knows that colleagues are getting more corrupt, his commitment to 
honest behaviour probably will be weakened. There are at least three arguments supporting this 
view (Sah 1991, Banerjee 1992): 
· internalised moral feelings of guilt by fraudulent behaviour become weaker as the number of 
corrupt tax officers increases; 
· when many others are involved in corruption, the loss of reputation (stigma) for each 
collector when discovered decreases; and  
· when many others are corrupt, this lowers the probability of being revealed due to the fact 
that the capacity of internal and external investigation units are constrained. 
 
In other words, “corruption may corrupt” (Andvig & Moene, 1990). Thus, an increase in fiscal 
corruption may initiate a vicious circle in the long run in the tax department. 
 
Third, this vicious circle may have impacts on the recruitment process of the tax administration. 
It is reasonable to assume that more fiscal corruption among tax collectors will attract 
potentially more corrupt employees (Besley & McLaren, 1993). Furthermore, in an atmosphere 
of corruption we can easily end up with a recruitment process based on the wrong premises 
(Huther & Shah, 2000). Significant above market rate wages in specific public institutions in 
order to reduce shirking and corruption may imply that one gets two prices for the same type 
of service. This may in general make a fertile ground for corruption and rent-seeking where 
attractive jobs are likely to be sold, and the sales price has built in the capital value of the salary 
surplus. Andvig (1999), for instance, reports from Azerbaijan that a regular customs official at a 
‘fat site’ has to pay USD 100 000 to get his position. A position is normally financed by the 
incumbent borrowing from family and friends. The customs official is assumed to have earned 
enough for repaying the investment after 6 months. Thereafter he is supposed to send a 
percentage (85 % is indicated by Andvig) of what he gains on corruption upwards to his 
superiors.  
 
Fourth, accepting corruption may have negative impacts on the future possibilities for 
reforming the tax system. For instance, important stakeholders, including bureaucrats and 
politicians, as well as powerful taxpayers, may resist changes in an attempt to protect their 
influence and control of the tax system. According to Winters (1996:166), the strongest 
                                                                                                                                                                
7 For a more general analysis of these mechanisms, see Hessing et. al. (1988) and Snavely (1990). 
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resistance to tax reforms in Indonesia came from the tax officials themselves, since they had 
the most to lose from the depersonalisation and simplification of the tax system. Flatters & 
Macleod (1995:409), also referring to Indonesia, assert that tax collectors actively opposed 
simplifications in property tax administration, income tax laws and tariff structures. Moreover, 
some observers argue that the extensive public sector regulations and complicated tax systems 
observed in many poor countries are the result of a deliberate strategy by civil servants, 
including senior tax officials, to facilitate corruption (Tanzi, 2000; and Myrdal, 1968).   
 
In summary, deliberately increasing fiscal corruption may initiate two vicious circles in the 
longer run. On the one hand, it may reduce peoples’ willingness to pay taxes; on the other 
hand, it may weaken a commitment to honest behaviour in the tax administration. Both these 
effects are closely related to the importance of values in tax collection and tax compliance. Our 
general point is that inducing fiscal corruption in the long run undermines the values essential 
to an efficient tax administration. As observed by Sen (1999: 276): “Indeed, in societies in 
which corrupt behaviour of the standard type is quite unusual, the reliance is, to a great extent, 
on compliance with codes of behaviour rather than on financial incentives to be corrupt. This 
forces attention on the norms and modes of behaviour that respectively prevail in different 
societies.”8 Of course, this does not imply that incentives are of no importance. But we 




4. Government trustworthiness[WLB7] 
Fiscal corruption is likely to undermine government trustworthiness and, thus, the legitimacy of 
the government, where legitimacy refers to citizens’ approval of the government, and justifies 
citizens’ obedience.9 When the institutions are legitimate, citizens have a predisposition to 
consider obedience to them as reasonable and appropriate (Fauvelle-Aymar, 1999). A 
government’s lack of legitimacy, on the other hand, diminishes almost by definition the 
perceived moral justification for obeying its laws (as we will return to in Section 5). 
Furthermore, of particular importance in this context is that citizens' disrespect for the tax laws 
may initiate disrespect for other laws, and, thus contribute to further undermining the 
legitimacy of government (Graetz et al., 1986). This suggests a vicious circle where distrust 
                                                   
8 See also Elster (1989:158). 
9 Following Lipset (1959:86), legitimacy can be defined as “the capacity of a political system to engender and 
maintain the belief that existing political institutions are the most appropriate or proper ones for the society”.  
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breeds distrust. In contrast, government trustworthiness and widespread public support tends 
to legitimise the public sector, and may so impose some social norm to pay taxes. Hence, it is 
important to take a broader view of the societal effects of corruption in tax administration.  
 
The need for a broader view on taxation derives from the fact taxation is essential for shaping 
state-citizen relations (Levi, 1988; Moore, 1998). For instance, in Europe over the past two 
centuries, taxation and disputes over the use of revenues have stimulated the development of 
greater citizen rights and privileges, with democratic institutions enforcing accountability and 
greater transparency in expenditures (Tilly, 1992). And it almost goes without saying that fiscal 
corruption, as an integral part of tax collection, does not contribute to establish productive 
state-society relations. Survey research from a number of countries concludes that citizens’ in 
general view corruption negatively even in countries where it is widespread. Miller et al. (1998), 
for instance, in a study of bribery in the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Bulgaria and Ukraine, find 
that public opinion in all four countries is against corruption. The morality of public office 
holders is therefore most likely an important source of government trustworthiness (Hardin, 
1996; Brennan, 1998). 
 
Recent research also indicates that citizens’ trust in their fellow citizens is strongly influenced 
by whether they have confidence in the government that they share (Brehm & Rahn, 1997). 
This observation strengthens the need for a broader view of the societal effects of fiscal 
corruption. We know that a functioning social order requires social behaviour (Serageldin & 
Grootaert, 1997; Grootaert, 1996) and a productive set of common norms (Bardhan, 1995), 
which will only evolve in a society of trustworthiness (Dasgupta, 1988).  
 
To summarise, there are two main reasons for taking a broader view on fiscal corruption. First, 
when government is perceived to be trustworthy, citizens are more likely to comply with its 
demands in general (Levi & Stoker, 2000). In this perspective, government trustworthiness is 
closely linked to citizens’ perceptions of the capacity of the government to make credible 
commitments about the use of their taxes, as well as the government’s procedures for 
designing and implementing policy non-arbitrarily (Levi, 1997, 1988). Second, government 
trustworthiness contributes to social behaviour in general and a productive set of common 
norms in society. These norms are important for establishing the more informal social networks 
and associations of civic engagement that effects the productivity of the community (Putnam, 
1993). Moreover, they are also crucial for strengthening the formalised institutional 
relationships in society such as the political regime, the rule of law, the court system, as well as 
the tax system, that may have important effects on the rate and pattern of economic 




5. Elimination of corruption as an end in itself 
Mookherjee (1997:6) claims that the elimination of corruption should not be considered an end 
in itself, and he substantiates this point by arguing that complete elimination of corruption may 
be impossible. We reject this line of reasoning. A non-corrupt society may be a utopian ideal, 
but this does not undermine the possibility of assigning intrinsic disvalue to corruption. To 
consider reduced corruption an end in itself is simply to say that is important in its own right, 
and does not have to be justified (as a value) on the basis of its effects on the economy and 
society in general. We believe this to be a reasonable position to take. Of course, there will be 
other ends to consider, and hence there we have to make trade-offs. But this only shows that 
there is a plurality of constitutive elements in the process of development.  
 
Corruption is the violation of established rules for personal gain, and the disvalue of corruption 
depends on the legitimacy of these rules. However, within a fair system of co-operation, the 
elimination of corruption should be considered an end in itself. This has been argued forcefully 
by Rawls (1993:16) among others, who views a fair system of co-operation as involving:  
 
“terms that each participant may reasonably accept, provided that everyone else 
likewise accepts them. Fair terms of co-operation specify an idea of reciprocity: all 
who are engaged in co-operation and who do their part as the rules and procedures 
require, are to benefit in an appropriate way as assessed by a suitable benchmark of 
comparison. Since the primary subject of justice is the basic structure of society, 
these fair terms are expressed by principles that specify basic rights and duties 
within its main institutions...” 
 
Moreover, Rawls (1993:19) argues that anyone with a sense of justice should apply and act 
from the public conception of justice which characterises the fair terms of social co-operation, 
and hence ought not to be involved in any kind of corruption.  
 
Considerations of this kind may be perceived to be of little relevance to policy debates in poor 
countries that are far from any ethical equilibrium of fair co-operation. We doubt, however,  the 
validity of such a point of view. In particular, we believe that Rawls’ line of reasoning may 
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contribute to establish an understanding of the main institutions in society in general – and tax 
administration in particular – as ways of specifying fair terms of co-operation, where violations 
of these terms is considered wrong in itself. By recognising this, we also see the plausibility of 
considering the elimination of corruption as an end in itself. 
 
6. Concluding remarks 
The point of departure for this note is the literature showing that increased fiscal corruption in 
some contexts may contribute to increased tax revenues. We do not argue against the relevance 
of this argument. On the contrary, it is important to clarify this relationship. However, we 
question the frequently made link to policy design. Based on existing literature on corruption, 
incentives, compliance and normative reasoning, we conclude that the reasonable starting point 
for policy debates in this area should be the straightforward one that an increase in fiscal 
corruption is not an appropriate instrument for raising tax revenues. Sustained development 
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[WLB1]This point about deficits seems to be a stray. I would delete it, as I’ve shown, or expand it. 
Page: 3 
[WLB2]You have yet to define corruption and I think this would be a good place to do so, to remind us of the 
moral dimension. See my suggestion. 
Page: 3 
[WLB3]Again, I am not sure I have stated your point correctly, but you need to more explicitly state it before 
launching into an example. 
Page: 3 
[WLB4]But isn’t it more a matter of degree? The more evasion the tax collector reports, the higher the bonus 
(which is based on collected taxes). So, the tax collector may get both a bribe for underreporting and a bonus for 
reporting some. Is this what you mean by corruption increasing tax revenues? That they are working for both the 
bonus and the bribe? 
Page: 5 
[WLB5]I think you should spell out what you mean here in prose, as I have suggested. I may not have gotten it right, 
however. 
Page: 6 
[WLB6]Again, I think another head would be better here, it doesn’t seem parallel to the others. To pair with the 
previous head, maybe Corruption and Long-term Costs. 
Page: 8 
[WLB7]Again, I think another head would be better here, it doesn’t seem parallel to the others. To pair with the 
previous head, maybe Corruption and Societal Costs. 
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Summary
ISSN 0804-3639
Recent literature on tax administration in poor countries
suggests that inducing more fiscal corruption may contribute
to reducing tax evasion and increasing tax revenues. But does
such an intriguing paradox justify policies that stimulate
corruption? Our answer is no, and this note puts forward three
arguments to support our view.  First, while an increase in
corruption may raise revenues in the short run, in general the
opposite will be the case in the longer run. Second, the
instrumental value of reducing corruption goes far beyond its
effects on tax evasion and tax revenues. Accepting corruption
as a policy strategy to increase tax revenues may undermine
values of democracy and good governance. Third, eliminating
corruption should be considered an end in itself. Thus, contrary
to recent suggestions on incentive reforms in tax
administration, the reasonable starting point for policy debates
in this area should still be that an increase in fiscal corruption
is not an appropriate instrument for raising tax revenues.
Sustained development cannot grow from an institutional
framework that fosters corruption and extra-legal tax
enforcement.
